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2Executive Summary
 Nicholas Kitchen, Editor, IDEAS Reports 
As the world continues to experience the fallout from the 2008 fi nancial crisis, it is increasingly 
turning towards China. The outsourced ‘workshop of the world’ has become the world’s great 
hope for growth, and the source of the capital the West’s indebted economies so desperately 
need. Simultaneously, and in the United States in particular, commentators and policymakers have 
increasingly voiced concerns that the economic clout of a communist superpower might pose a 
threat to the liberal world order. These contradictory impulses – China as opportunity and China as 
threat – demonstrate one clear truth, exhibited in the Obama administration’s much-trailed ‘Asian 
pivot’: that China is important.
The pace of China’s integration into the world economy, as well as the relatively closed nature of 
China’s government and society, means that whilst China’s economy may have opened up, our 
understanding of what drives China’s foreign and economic policies remains limited. Moreover, 
China’s apparent adherence to Deng Xiaoping’s code of caution and camoufl age makes the task 
of throwing a light on China’s international role even more diffi cult, an opacity which underpins 
the more alarmist assessments.
It is in this context that this report attempts to provide a systematic assessment of the economic 
bases of China’s foreign policy and the challenges the country faces as it makes the transition from 
rising power to superpower. In doing so, it is informed by a central question, of to what extent 
China’s remarkable growth has given rise to a geoeconomic strategy for China’s future.
The answer, in short, is that China’s foreign economic policies are not the result of a coherent, 
directed strategy. China’s leadership understand the overarching need to rebalance China’s economy, 
both domestically and internationally, in order to sustain growth and secure the country’s continued 
development. But beyond this overarching goal there is little evidence of a plan as such; instead, 
particular domestic priorities and politics drive China’s policies, often in contradictory directions. 
Nowhere is this more marked than in China’s military build-up and increased strategic assertiveness 
within its own region, marked by a series of incidents in which the competing impulses of a variety 
of domestic actors played a greater role in the crafting of policy than a strategic consideration of 
diplomatic interests. This haphazard approach, as Jonathan Fenby demonstrates, is having the 
paradoxical effect of reinforcing the ties of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacifi c.
Not only is China not conducting a coherent geoeconomic strategy, it is often not in direct control 
of the policies it has, even in so important an area as access to resources, as Shaun Breslin’s analysis 
shows. Nor is China necessarily that competent in the international economic arena, as demonstrated 
by the decidedly mixed record of its fi rms’ international investments. Signifi cantly, these failings of 
foreign-economic policies are increasingly producing diplomatic diffi culties for China.
3This analysis suggests that ascribing a strategic plan to 
China – whether for the purposes of opportunity or 
threat narratives – is misplaced. China is attempting 
to come to terms with its integration into the world 
economy, its importance within that economy, and 
the pressures and responsibilities that emerge from 
those distinctly political realities. China’s foreign 
economic policies, and in particular how it goes about 
rebalancing, will shape the world economy in the years 
ahead, and understanding the sources of those policies 
will be central to good policymaking in the West. As the 
analysis here shows, China’s leadership is pragmatic, 
but it is also subject to signifi cant and confl icting 
pressures both domestically and internationally. There 
are signs that China is beginning to reconcile itself to 
its role within the global economic system, particularly 
on issues such as trade governance, but it is by no 
means clear that China is willing or capable of using its 
position to strategically reshape that order. Ultimately, 
as Arne Westad points out, China’s international 
role will be determined by what happens within 
China, and how China’s leaders mitigate the political 
consequences of economic rebalancing. If they succeed 
in doing so, China’s geoeconomic strategy need no 
longer be the source of so much diplomatic debate. ■
  
 
